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ABSTRACT 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation signal is extremely vulnerable 
to intentional and unintentional interference.  Increased dependence on GPS by military 
users has created a need to quickly detect and locate interference at its source.  Current 
methods for detecting and locating GPS interference sources employ a network of 
multiple sensors to identify interference.  The data collected from sensors is then sent to a 
remote centralized processing station and analyzed to determine the location of the 
interference source.  Although this method has demonstrated effectiveness in this 
endeavor, it introduces latency between the time of detection at the sensor, and the 
location of the source.  The intent of this thesis is to investigate whether a portable hand 
held interference detection system can provide more timely detection and location 
information to provide the actionable intelligence to the disadvantaged GPS users. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Our nation is at war.  The United States has been deeply engaged in a war for five 
plus years against terrorist elements in Iraq, Afghanistan, and various other places around 
the world.  The price being paid in both blood and treasure can never truly be articulated 
or appreciated.  Figure 1 below, which consists of a poignant picture and embedded quote 
provide the motivation with which this thesis was embarked on. 
. 
What did you do today for 
freedom? Today, at the front, he 
died …  Today, what did you do? 
Next time you see a list of dead 
and wounded, ask yourself: 
'What have I done today for 
freedom’? ‘What can I do 
tomorrow for freedom’? ‘What 
can I do tomorrow that will save 
the lives of men like this and help 
them win the war?
hat did you do today for 
freedom? Today, at the front, he 
died   Today, what did you do? 
Next time you see a list of dead 
and wounded, ask yourself: 
' hat have I done today for 
freedom’? ‘What can I do 
tomorrow for freedom’? ‘What 
can I do tomorrow that will save 
the lives of men like this and help 
them win the war?
 
Figure 1.   Slide 54 from On Point Warrior-Quotes master copy (From Coffey)1 
 
The possible improvement in increased combat lethality and survivability that 
may be obtained by the work included in this thesis is wholly dedicated as a small means 
of addressing the question in the figure above:  “What can I do tomorrow that will save 
the lives of men like this and help them win the war?” 
                                                 
1 Bill Coffey, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC), On Point Warrior Quotes-
Master Copy (Slide 54 of Powerpoint Presentation), 2008 Mass E-Mail (accessed July 13, 2008).  
 2
The Global Positioning System (GPS), a highly reliable Position, Navigation, and 
Timing (PNT) system, has become a ubiquitous capability for both civil and military 
applications.  The civil capabilities provided by GPS are now so thoroughly embedded in 
the day-to-day lives of people throughout the world that any interruption in this service 
would cause tremendous problems in numerous areas.  GPS provides the information 
necessary for commercial aircraft take-off and landing abilities, end-to-end logistics 
monitoring for businesses supply chain management, personal and business navigation, 
and highly accurate surveying, to name a few.  Figure 2 illustrates several of the 
technologies systems and operations functions that are reliant upon GPS. 
 
 
Figure 2.   GPS Dependent Systems and Operations (After JNWC-Navwar-Threat 
Overview Brief)2 
                                                 
2 Robert "Hawg" Haseloff, "JNWC-Navwar-Threat Overview Brief (Unclassified Portion) United 
States Army FA-40 Symposium" (Colorado Springs, Colorado, Joint Navigation Warfare Center, 2-5 
September 2008) (accessed 12 September 2008).  
 3
The effects obtained by denial of this GPS service to U.S. military applications 
also creates the potential to cause devastating consequences by eliminating or degrading 
U.S. superiority in a myriad of military systems which use the information provided by 
GPS.  There are several different types of jammers and sources of interference which 
have the ability to deny, degrade, and/or disrupt the GPS signal from coherently 
providing its sought after information.  Figure 3 lists several of the jamming methods, as 
well as, Electro-Magnetic Interference.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Types of Jammers and Interference which affect the GPS Signal (From 
JNWC-Navwar-Threat Overview Brief)3 
 
                                                 
3 Robert "Hawg" Haseloff, "JNWC-Navwar-Threat Overview Brief (Unclassified Portion) United 
States Army FA-40 Symposium" (Colorado Springs, Colorado, Joint Navigation Warfare Center, 2-5 
September 2008) (accessed 12 September 2008).  
 4
The enemies of the United States are acutely aware of this potential Achilles heel 
and are actively seeking ways to exploit this potential weakness.  One of the major ways 
that they are trying to achieve this is through effective jamming of GPS signals  
At the Paris Air Show in 1999, a Russian company called Aviaconversia 
demonstrated a 4-watt GPS jammer. The jammer weighed about 19 
pounds and was capable of denying GPS reception for more than 100 
miles. Many such jammers are available through the Internet for as little as 
$39.9 [$3999].4 
The previous quote taken from an anonymous source on the Internet clearly 
demonstrates that there is both a demand and an industry out there capable of providing 
low-cost GPS jammers that are effective over fairly long ranges.  Figure 4 shows an 
Aviaconversia 4W GPS Jammer that was offered for sale at the Moscow Air show in 
1997.  Knowing that these types of inexpensive GPS jammers are readily available, in 
addition to their more powerful military-grade counterparts, it becomes blatantly obvious 
that our military forces must have a rapid and effective means of identifying these 
jamming sources so that their interfering signals may be neutralized. 
                                                 
4 Wikipedia contributors, "Aviaconversiya," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 
http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/aviaconversiya?oldid=17841971 (accessed 19 September 2008).  
 5
 
Figure 4.   Aviaconversia 4W GPS Jammer5 
As previously stated, relatively low power GPS jammers are effective over 
extensive ranges, especially if they are employed from the air in which they have a 
straight line of sight signal path which is less impeded by obstacles on the ground.  
Figure 5 illustrates jammers at various power levels and their effective ranges when 
compared to the power levels required to affect various levels of GPS Acquisition.  
Figure 6 gives a graphical representation of the effectiveness of a four-watt jammer 
employed from both the ground and the air.  Figure 6 also illustrates the significant 
differences of effective GPS jamming ranges when comparing land-based jamming 
which has many obstacles such as terrain, vegetation, buildings, etcetera to block or 
attenuate the jamming signal and that jamming which occurs in the air and unimpeded by 
 
                                                 
5 Rockwell International, "GPS Jamming," Rockwell International, http://www.ac11.org/gps1.htm, 
(accessed 10 September 2008).  
 6
anything except the natural physical characteristics of the airspace.  Figure 6 further 
shows that loss of lock due to air-based jamming occurs at 38km and for land-based 
jamming loss of lock doesn’t occur until you get within 1km. 
 
Figure 5.   Jammer effects versus distance (From JNWC-Navwar-Threat Overview 
Brief)6 
                                                 
6 Haseloff, JNWC-Navwar-Threat Overview Brief (Unclassified Portion) United States Army FA-40 
Symposium, 1-2-30  
 7
 
Figure 6.   Received Jammer/Signal (J/S) as a Function of Distance from Jammer (From 
Brown, Reynolds, Roberts, and Serie)7 
Since the onset of declared Full Operational Capability of the GPS satellite 
constellation on April 27, 19958 by Air Force Space Command, GPS satellites have 
become an essential element in the United States military’s arsenal to fight in and win 
this nation’s wars.  GPS satellites provide the PNT information necessary for our forces 
to have and maintain the situational awareness to know when and where they’re at while 
stationary or on the move.  The kind of information provided by GPS is essential 
regardless of if you’re using it for force tracking and situational awareness as in Blue 
Force Tracking (BFT)/Blue Force Situational Awareness (BFSA), using it to provide 
highly accurate position and navigation information to direct smart munitions, or using it 
to assist in the conduct of Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) missions.  
 
                                                 
7 Alison Brown and others, "Jammer and Interference Location System - Design and Initial Test" 
Alexandria, 1999). 
8 United States Naval Observatory, "USNO NAVSTAR Global Positioning System," 
http://tycho.usno.navy.mil/gpsinfo.html (accessed 19 September 2008).  
 8
The challenge of monitoring GPS signals for interference (intentional or 
unintentional) and analyzing the effects that this interference has on current and future 
operations are issues that are being brought up by those space warriors recently returning 
from deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Position, Navigation, and Timing Navigation through the use of satellites 
allows for extremely accurate maneuver and targeting. Many systems also 
depend on Global Positioning System (GPS) timing for the 
synchronization of communications.  The number of land force systems 
that have an integrated GPS receiver is large and growing, to the point that 
numerous missions are dependent on it. Widespread use of GPS in 
military operations in the last few years has uncovered unforeseen 
problems, and Army and Marine unit staffs are now routinely required to 
resolve complex, technical anomalies with GPS in support of operations. 
Furthermore, staff members must monitor the accuracy of GPS and the 
effect this accuracy may have on current and planned operations.9  
It is with these challenges in mind that this thesis seeks to address the issue of 
GPS Jamming and/or interference by attempting to identify its source and location.  The 
idea of GPS jamming and interference location detection is nothing new; it has been 
going on for almost as long as GPS has been in existence.   
There are several programs both unclassified and classified that address the 
challenge of GPS jamming.  A Jammer Location (JLOC)10 System approach is a system 
that has been suggested to use numerous receivers that send back their GPS information 
to a centralized processing station, which calibrates their information against a known 
grid coordinate that has previously been taken prior to the onset of jamming.  This known 
coordinate is then compared to a receiver reported coordinate during jamming and the 
difference is obtained.  This is done for several known locations in a given area of 
operations.  These known deviations are then calibrated for the various other receivers 
throughout the area of operations.  Knowing these deviations, analysis can then be done 
 
                                                 
9 Bob Guerriero, LTC, Tom James, LTC and Jim Rozzi, LTC, "The Future of Army Space Forces - A 
Vision to Optimize Tactical and Operational Space Support," The Army Space Journal, 2007, 12, 
http://www.smdc-armyforces.army.mil/ASJ/Edition.asp?E=2 (accessed 13 July 2008).  
10 Brown and others, Jammer and Interference Location System - Design and Initial Test  
 9
to ascertain the most likely source and location of the jammer.  This system would 
provide for a centralized analysis and processing hub that could be queried to try to 
determine jamming and interference that has already occurred. 
The problem to date, at least from a forward-deployed soldier perspective, is that 
although a jammer location may be able to eventually be determined, the time it takes is 
not responsive enough to allow for these soldiers to continue the mission unimpeded.  
The main objective of this thesis is to make inroads towards coming up with an initial 
design of a hand-held GPS interference detector that could provide actionable 
intelligence to forward-deployed, disadvantaged soldiers which allows them to take the 
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II. GPS LINK BUDGET 
The amount of power available to terrestrial GPS receivers is extremely low.  
Figure 7 provides some practical perspective to illustrate just how modest this power 
level is and why the GPS signal is susceptible to jamming over great distances with a low 
power jammer. 
 
Figure 7.   Signal Strength comparisons with the GPS Signal (From JNWC-Navwar-
Threat Overview Brief)11 
A. THE GENERAL LINK BUDGET EQUATION 
In order to establish a successful communications link, orbiting GPS satellites and 
terrestrial-based GPS receivers must meet the requirements of the link budget equation.  
The general link budget equation is given by:  SR = Pt + Ll + Gt + Lfs + Gr + Lo, where, 
• SR = Received signal power 
                                                 
11 Haseloff, JNWC-Navwar-Threat Overview Brief (Unclassified Portion) United States Army FA-40 
Symposium, 1-2-30  
 12
• Pt = Satellite transmitter power 
• Ll = Transmitter line losses 
• Gt = Satellite transmitter antenna gain 
• Lfs = Loss due to free space 
• Gr = Receiver antenna gain 
• Lo = Other losses 
Each of the terms in the link budget equation represented as either power or gain 
is assigned a positive value, while those annotated as losses are assigned a negative value.  
The sum of all the gains and losses determines the power available at the GPS receiver.  
The minimum power requirement at the receiver is based on a quantity known as the 
signal-to-noise ratio or SNR.  Figure 8 depicts both the Jammer-to-Signal Ratio (JSR) 
and SNR for a given set of testing. 
 
Figure 8.   Jammer-to-Signal Ratio and SNR graphs (From GPS World)12 
As its name suggests, the SNR is formed by the ratio of the received signal power, 
SR to the noise power.  Noise power, N, is given by:  N = kTB, where, 
• k = the Boltzmann’s constant 1.38x10-23 Joules/K 
• T = the receiver temperature in degrees Kelvin 
• B = Bandwidth of the receiver in Hertz 
As a general rule of thumb, the minimum power required to establish a link is 
determined by a receiver signal power that is 10 decibels above the noise power.   
                                                 
12 Borje Forssell and Trond Olsen, "GPS World - Jamming GPS," GPS World, 
http://www.gpsworld.com/gpsworld/content/printContentPopup.jsp?id=43432 (accessed 19 September 
2008).  
 13
The sum formed by the first three terms in the link equation is often referred to as 
the Effective Isotropic Radiated Power, or EIRP.  This combined term is generally used 
to calculate a link budget when the individual terms are not available.  Each GPS satellite 
is equipped with multiple transmitters for which the EIRP is known.  The transmitters are 
dedicated to emitting at 1575.42 MHz and 1227.60 MHz.  Each of these frequencies is 
commonly referred to as the L1 and L2 link respectively 
1. L1 Link 
The L1 link has the following terms in the link equation: 
• EIRP = Pt + Ll + Gt = 26.8 dBW 
• Lfs = -184.4 dBW 
• Gr = 3 dBW 
• Lo = -5.4 dBW 
This gives the power available to the receiver as: 
• SR = EIRP + Lfs + Gr + Lo = -160 dBW or 1x10-16 W13 
All GPS receivers must have the sensitivity to detect this extremely low power 
signal to establish a link.   
2. L2 Link 
The L2 link has the following terms in the link equation: 
• EIRP = Pt + Ll + Gt = 19.7 dBW 
• Lfs = -182.3 dBW 
• Gr = 3 dBW 
• Lo = -6.4 dBW 
This gives the power available to the receiver as: 
• SR = EIRP + Lfs + Gr + Lo = -166 dBW or 2.5x10-17 W14 
                                                 
13 Navtech GPS, "GPS L1 Link Budget," http://www.navtechgps.com/pdf/GPS L1 Link Budget 
ERP.pdf (accessed 22 September 2008).  
14 Navtech GPS, "GPS L2 Link Budget," 
http://www.navtechgps.com/pdf/GpsNetworking_LinkBudget.pdf (accessed 22 September 2008).  
 14
As demonstrated in Figure 9, the receiver power quantities for both the L1 and L2 
links at are at relatively low levels.  GPS receivers sensitive enough to detect these low 
power levels are also susceptible to local interference from transmitters operating on the 
same frequency. 
 
Figure 9.   GPS Signal Strength Level vs. Elevation Angle (From Global Positioning 
System Standard Positioning Service Signal Specification)15 
                                                 
15 USCG, "Global Positioning System Standard Positioning Service Signal Specification, 2nd 
Edition," USCG, http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/pubs/gps/sigspec/gpssps1.pdf (accessed 14 August 2008).  
 15
III. METHODS OF DETECTION AND LOCALIZATION 
There are numerous methods available for detecting interference on GPS signals.  
When one considers that the GPS signals (L1 and L2) are nothing more than RF signals 
at their respective frequencies it becomes amazingly clear just how susceptible they are to 
interference, whether it be intentional or not.  Knowing the reliability or certainty of the 
information given by a system is of utmost importance to the user.  The trustworthiness 
of the information obtained has also been described as the integrity of the system. 
Integrity can be defined as a measure of confidence on the specified 
accuracy of any given system.  Precision GPS applications such CAT II/III 
aircraft landings place demands for high levels of integrity from a GPS 
receiver, given the risks involved.  Unfortunately RF interference, which 
occurs frequently in the operating environment of a GPS receiver, can 
surreptitiously degrade accuracy, and thereby compromise the integrity of 
the receiver.  Such interference may be intentional (from an RF jammer) 
or non-intentional, as would result from channel cohabitance or harmonics 
from mobile cellular, satellite, TV and FM radio.16 
Analyzing the integrity of the GPS signal at the receiver location allows for the 
determination of whether the signal is experiencing interference or not.  One of the most 
pressing problems that is not addressed by receivers themselves is the challenge of noise 
and how that may affect the pseudorange error of a GPS signal.  The higher the noise 
from either a Continuous Wave (CW) source or an Additive White Gaussian Noise 
(AWGN) source on a GPS RF signal causes the Carrier-to-Noise (C/No) ratio to be 
reduced which in turn causes the pseudorange error to increase.  This detrimental error to 
the GPS accuracy could go totally unnoticed if there were not some sort of analysis being 
automatically done on the signal to ensure that this type of induced error was not 
occurring.  Some of the more common and familiar methods of testing the integrity of an 
RF signal in use these days are: Correlator Output Power, Variance of Correlator Output 
                                                 
16 Awele Ndili, Stanford University and Dr. Per Enge, Stanford University, "GPS Receiver 
Autonomous Interference Detection" 
(http://waas.stanford.edu/~wwu/papers/gps/PDF/interfere_detect_ann98.pdf, April 1998) (accessed 30 July 
2008).  
 16
Power, Carrier Phase Vacillation, Active Gain Control (AGC) Control Loop Gain, 
Multiple-Model Adaptive Estimation (MMAE), and Receiver Estimation of C/No. 
After determining that interference is occurring on the GPS Signal, it is then 
useful to know where that interference is emanating from so that actions can be taken to 
resolve the interference problem.  The challenge of localization of the interference is one 
that can be approached from numerous directions as well.  Three of the most common 
approaches to localization of RF interference are by using the following:  Carrier/Noise 
Jammer Location Sensor, Angle of Arrival Jammer Location Sensor, and Time 
Difference of Arrival Jammer Location Sensor.  Let’s first take a look at the interference 
detection methods. 
A. DETECTION 
1. Correlator Output Power (COP) 
Correlator Output Power as defined by Awele Ndili and Dr. Per Enge of Stanford 
University at their presentation at the 1998 IEEE Position, Location and Navigation 
Symposium – PLANS ‘98 is: 
The correlator output power (COP) is a quantity computed in the receiver 
which gives an indication of the average post-correlation signal to noise 
ratio.  It is computed from equation 1 below: 
Correlator Output Power = I2 + Q2 / Expected Noise Floor       (1) 
where I and Q are the 1ms-averaged in-phase and quadrature prompt 
correlator signal.  Expected noise floor is receiver specific, and is derived 
from statistic expectations for a specific receiver digital implementation.17 
 
 
                                                 
17 Awele Ndili, Stanford University and Dr. Per Enge, Stanford University, "GPS Receiver 
Autonomous Interference Detection" 
(http://waas.stanford.edu/~wwu/papers/gps/PDF/interfere_detect_ann98.pdf, April 1998) (accessed 30 July 
2008).  
 17
Looking at the equation given in the quote above it becomes readily apparent that 
for a specific receiver with a known expected noise floor and the measurements of the in-
phase and quadrature signals, the characteristic COP can be calculated for a given 
receiver.  A different value for COP indicates that some type of noise interference may be 
occurring due to a decrease in COP. 
2. Variance of Correlator Output Power  
Correlator Output Power variance is exactly as the name implies, it is the variance 
of the Correlator Output Power.  Variance is the standard mathematical and statistical 
definition of variance, which is the square of the standard deviation.  The idea of using 
COP variances as a metric for the integrity of a GPS signal are due to the fact that they 
serve as robust indices, in various types of jamming environments, to illustrate changes to 
GPS signals as encountered at the receiver.  In Figure 10 below, Ndili and Enge 
graphically depict the effects that interference has on COP variance beginning with 
interference and through reacquisition of the GPS signal.  Figure 10 clearly illustrates the 
decrease in variance between the signal being subjected to interference and then not, from 
roughly 25dB to approximately 6 or 7dB.  It is also easily observable the step increase in 
the COP when cycling out of interference. 
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Figure 10.   Correlator Output Power for a GPS Receiver (From Ndili & Enge)18 
3. Carrier Phase Vacillation 
This metric examines the fluctuation of carrier phasor angles of the GPS signal 
with respect to time.  It has been shown that these variances in the phasor angles are a 
function of the level of noise within the signal.  Articulated in a more precise manner: 
Carrier phase vacillation provides a measure of the variance or jitter in 
carrier phase measurements from one measurement epoch to the next, and 
is defined here as: 
Carrier Phase Vacillation =  
 Time average[abs{Carrier Phasei – Carrier Phasei-1}] 
where i is the 1 ms epoch index.19 
                                                 
18 Awele Ndili, Stanford University and Dr. Per Enge, Stanford University, "GPS Receiver 
Autonomous Interference Detection" 
(http://waas.stanford.edu/~wwu/papers/gps/PDF/interfere_detect_ann98.pdf, April 1998) (accessed 30 July 
2008).  
19 Awele Ndili, Stanford University and Dr. Per Enge, Stanford University, "GPS Receiver 
Autonomous Interference Detection" 
(http://waas.stanford.edu/~wwu/papers/gps/PDF/interfere_detect_ann98.pdf, April 1998) (accessed 30 July 
2008).  
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This carrier phase vacillation is a robust indicator of the level of noise present in a 
signal and is therefore also a good choice for using as an identifier of interference.  Noise 
comes not only from that generated by the interference signal, but also that noise that is 
inherent within the receiver clock.  Figure 11 provides a graphic example of the effects of 
noise on the carrier phasor angles of a GPS signal. 
The data used to generate this graph comes from the arctangent of the in-phase 
and quadrature signal phase measurements.  For this particular plot, the carrier phase 
vacillation is approximately 11 degrees. 
 
Figure 11.   Carrier Phase for a GPS Receiver with a FLL Carrier Tracking Loop (From 
Ndili & Enge)20 
                                                 
20 Awele Ndili, Stanford University and Dr. Per Enge, Stanford University, "GPS Receiver 
Autonomous Interference Detection" 
(http://waas.stanford.edu/~wwu/papers/gps/PDF/interfere_detect_ann98.pdf, April 1998) (accessed 30 July 
2008).  
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4.  Active Gain Control (AGC) Control Loop Gain 
Active Gain Control is another test statistic that is useful in identifying and 
corroborating that interference, in the form of pseudorange error, is occurring on a signal.  
The analog signal from GPS is digitized and converted to a digital signal by means of a 
converter that is set to maintain a specified ratio of digitized signal output levels.  The 
linear relationship between increase AGC and increased pseudorange error generally 
holds, except in the cases of satellite signal attenuation and pulsed CW and pulsed 
AWGN interference.  See Figure 12 which provides the data plots of an experiment 
illustrating these attributes and relationships. 
In the case of signal attenuation, this result is expected.  AGC is impacted by the 
total power of incoming signals from all satellites in view and therefore the depletion of 
one satellite’s signal power will not have as significant an impact on AGC gain as one 
might think.  Therefore, in the case of spacecraft vehicle signal attenuation, AGC Control 
Loop Gain is not a metric for determining interference.      
For the scenario of pulsed CW and pulsed AWGN interference it has been shown 
that a linear relationship between these pulsed interferences’ pseudorange error and AGC 
gain does not exist either.  Early on, the pseudorange error generally becomes unaffected 
by increases in AGC, therefore no one-to-one linear relationship.  Here again, in the cases 
of pulsed CW and pulsed AWGN, AGC Control Loop Gain would not be a wise selection 




Figure 12.   Pseudorange Error vs. AGC Gain (From Ndili and Eng)21 
One thing noted in the paper by Ndili and Enge, 
This peculiarity of AGC gain can be used in conjunction with other test 
statistics to discriminate between pseudorange accuracy degradation due 
to pulsed and non-pulsed interference, and signal blockage.22 
For example, if one referred to the COP, COP variance, Carrier Phase Vacillation 
metrics they could determine that interference was occurring.  If they also looked at the 
AGC Gain and noted no significant increase in pseudorange error this would indicate that 
some type of pulsed jamming (CW or AWGN) was occurring. 
 
 
                                                 
21 Awele Ndili, Stanford University and Dr. Per Enge, Stanford University, "GPS Receiver 
Autonomous Interference Detection" 
(http://waas.stanford.edu/~wwu/papers/gps/PDF/interfere_detect_ann98.pdf, April 1998) (accessed 30 July 
2008).  
22 Awele Ndili, Stanford University and Dr. Per Enge, Stanford University, "GPS Receiver 
Autonomous Interference Detection" 
(http://waas.stanford.edu/~wwu/papers/gps/PDF/interfere_detect_ann98.pdf, April 1998) (accessed 30 July 
2008).  
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On the other hand, if they noted from the AGC Gain versus Pseudorange error 
plot that pseudorange error was increasing without any significant increase in the 
quantizer threshold, this would indicate that Spacecraft Vehicle attenuation might be the 
culprit for the interference. 
5. Multiple-Model Adaptive Estimation (MMAE) 
Multiple-Model Adaptive Estimation (MMAE) is another method used to detect 
interference on a GPS signal.  MMAE makes use of the estimation prowess of Kalman 
filters in order to provide a best guess for accurate information.  In an October 1998 
paper in IEEE by White, Maybeck, and DeVilbiss they described the MMAE process as 
follows: 
Such an MMAE is composed of a bank of parallel filters, each 
hypothesizing a different failure status, along with an evaluation of the 
current probability of each hypothesis being correct, to form a probability-
weighted average state estimate as an output.  
For interference/jamming degradation represented as increased 
measurement noise variance, simulation results show that, because of the 
good failure detection and isolation (FDI) performance using MMAE, the 
blended navigation performance is essentially that of a single extended 
Kalman filter (EKF) artificially informed of the actual interference noise 
variance.23 
Basically, the MMAE process consists of taking the information obtained from a 
sensor and passing that information through various Kalman filters that have been set up 
to model various environments and conditions that might be experienced by the sensor.  
This information is then sent out from the Kalman filters in the form of a computed state 
vector and its corresponding residuals.  The size of residuals obtained is an indicator as to 
the level of agreement between that particular Kalman filter’s model and that actual 
information obtained from the sensor.  The residual information is analyzed by a 
Conditional Probability Weighting Computation which determines the probability of 
                                                 
23 Nathan A. White, Peter S. Maybeck and Stewart DeVilbiss, "Detection of interference/jamming and 
Spoofing in a DGPS-Aided Inertial System," IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems 34, 
no. 4 (IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems. Vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 1208-1217. October 
1998), 1208-1217.  
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model accuracy for this Kalman filter.  This is done for every Kalman filter and then the 
individual probabilities are then reconstituted back together and a Bayesian blended 
estimate is then given.  Figure 13 pictorially depicts the MMAE process. 
 
Figure 13.   MMAE Estimation process (From White, Maybeck, & DeVilbiss)24 
6. Receiver Estimation of C/No 
This approach at the detection and characterization of CW interference is one of 
the more recent attempts and was presented in April 2006 at the Position, Location, and 
Navigation Symposium for IEEE/ION.  The title of the paper is: “A Novel Approach in 
Detection and Characterization of CW Interference of GPS Signal Using Receiver 
Estimation of C/No.” This approach uses some of the previously described metrics and 
then seeks to slim down the hardware and software requirements necessary to do this. 
In this paper, AGC level together with correlator output power is used to 
detect and characterize the RFI but the difference is that the receiver 
simply uses a standard correlator.  The other advantage of this algorithm is 
                                                 
24 Awele Ndili, Stanford University and Dr. Per Enge, Stanford University, "GPS Receiver 
Autonomous Interference Detection" 
(http://waas.stanford.edu/~wwu/papers/gps/PDF/interfere_detect_ann98.pdf, April 1998) , (accessed 30 
July 2008).  
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that it is capable of detecting and characterizing CW RFI even if it is not 
close in frequency to any of the C/A code spectral lines.25 
The overall thrust of this method of detection and characterization is to compare 
the theoretical C/No with the actual C/No and then using this information along with the 
knowledge of the structure of the GPS C/A code, then the existence and characterization 
of the interference can be determined. 
Figure 14 illustrates the process by which the C/A code is combined with the 
navigation data and then the CW RFI and noise are added.  It is then shown that the 
incoming code is compared and multiplied by the receiver’s replica code and then the 
tracking loop’s low pass filter filters out data and interference outside the bandwidth.  
The take away behind the set of graphs within this consolidated figure is to illustrate that 
J_before (interference power before) is different than J_after (interference power after).  
The value of J_after is determined by the strength of the nearest line to the interference.  
The following quote describes why this is important. 
Now, if we have an RFI with fixed frequency and a GPS signal with 
Doppler frequency that varies with satellite motion, over time the RFI 
coincides with several different consecutive lines in the spectrum.  Each of 
these lines has its own unique effect on the remaining interference in the 
output of the loops.  We propose to examine the effect of a series of lines, 
and thus calculate the frequency of the RFI.  The quantity that can best 
reflect this effect is the correlator output power.  Carrier to noise ratio 
which quantifies the quality of the signal is the parameter which is use for 
this purpose.26 
Figure 15 graphically depicts the correlator process at the receiver.  This figure 
illustrates the fact that the incoming GPS signal gets processed through both a code 
tracking loop as well as a carrier tracking loop, which consists of both the In-Phase and  
 
 
                                                 
25 A.T. Balaei, A. G. Dempster, and J. Barnes, A Novel Approach in Detection and Characterization 
of CW Interference of GPS Signal using Receiver Estimation of C/No, 2006), 1120-1126.  
26 A. T. Balaei, A. G. Dempster, and J. Barnes, A Novel Approach in Detection and Characterization 
of CW Interference of GPS Signal using Receiver Estimation of C/No, 2006), 1120-1126.  
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Quadrature portions of the signal being passed through low-pass filters and combined and 
then fed back through a low-pass filter and oscillator and then back to be combined with 






Figure 14.   Development of C/A code with CW RFI then passed through a receiver’s low 
pass filter (After Balaei, Dempster, and Barnes)27 
                                                 
27 A. T. Balaei, A. G. Dempster and J. Barnes, A Novel Approach in Detection and Characterization 
of CW Interference of GPS Signal using Receiver Estimation of C/No, 2006), 1120-1126.  
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Figure 15.   Correlator (Code and Carrier Tracking Loops) (From Balaei, Dempster, and 
Barnes)28 
The expression for the theoretical C/No was also previously developed by the 
same authors who authored the above approach.  In their previous work they developed 
the equation for C/No to be as follows: 
29  
This was then slightly altered in their more recent work to the following equation: 
 30 
where: 
N0 is the thermal noise power (Watts) 
                                                 
28 A. T. Balaei, A. G. Dempster and J. Barnes, A Novel Approach in Detection and Characterization 
of CW Interference of GPS Signal using Receiver Estimation of C/No, 2006), 1120-1126.  
29 A. T. Balaei, J. Barnes and A. G. Dempster, "Characterization of Interference Effects on GPS 
Signal Carrier Phase Error" (Melbourne, Australia: Spatial Science Institute, Proceedings of SSC 2005 
Spatial Intelligence, Innovation, Praxis: The national biennial Conference of the Spatial Science Institute, 
September 2005). 
30 Balaei, Dempster and Barnes, A Novel Approach in Detection and Characterization of CW 
Interference of GPS Signal using Receiver Estimation of C/No, 1120-1126  
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Ln is the processing gain in the noise (unitless) 
Td is the integration duration time (seconds) 
τ is the signal-reference code phase difference in code chips (degrees) 
∆fc is the actual carrier frequency minus the estimate of the carrier frequency 
(Hz) 
∆fi is the actual interference frequency minus the estimate of the interference 
frequency (Hz) 
J is the interference power (Watts) 
Cj is the jth spectral line coefficient 
R0(τ) is the cross correlation of the received C/A code and the receiver replica of 
the same code. 
The calculation of the actual C/No ratio is obtained by the narrow-to-wideband 
power ratio method.  In extremely over-simplified operational-speak, this method 
determines the C/No ratio as an expression which basically divides the average 
narrowband power over the accumulation interval by the average wideband power over 
the interval.  Using this information, the measured carrier power-to-noise density as a 
function of the power ratio measurement can be determined to be:  
     31 
where  is the ratio of the average narrow band power to the average wideband 
power 
τ is the accumulation interval 
M is the sub-intervals of τ 
Figure 16 depicts the plot of an experiment which illustrates the relative 
agreement between the theoretical C/No and the actual C/No with a slight offset due to 
                                                 
31 Balaei, Dempster and Barnes, A Novel Approach in Detection and Characterization of CW 
Interference of GPS Signal using Receiver Estimation of C/No, 1120-1126  
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the lack of clarity on the unknowns, specifically the interference power.  Referring back 
to the mathematical expression for the theoretical C/No it can be readily observed that 
other than the frequency of the interference, there are three other parameters: signal 
power, background noise power, and interference power.  The first two of these 
parameters are known for the given operating environment.  We know what the signal 
power should be from a GPS satellite and we know what the background noise power 
should be when we take into account the operating environment.  What we don’t readily 
know yet is the interference power.  Interference power can be estimated from the AGC 
level in the RF front-end.32   Once this is known we can have the theoretical C/No 
approximate the actual C/No as closely as possible.  This enables the ability to have the 
least amount of difference between the two calculations at the frequency where the 
interference exists.  Therefore, the frequency where there is the least amount of 
difference between the two C/No’s is the frequency where the interference is occurring. 
 
Figure 16.   C/No plots calculated using both the parametric[theoretical] method and the 
power ratio (actual) method (From Balaei, Dempster, and Barnes)33 
                                                 
32 F. Bastide, Christophe Macabiau and DM Akos, "Automatic Gain Control (AGC) as an Interference 
Assessment Tool" 2003. 
33 Balaei, Dempster and Barnes, A Novel Approach in Detection and Characterization of CW 
Interference of GPS Signal using Receiver Estimation of C/No, 1120-1126  
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The previous six methods have illustrated some of the most familiar and effective 
ways to identify that interference is occurring on a GPS signal.  We are also interested in 
determining the location of the interfering source so that actions can be taken to eliminate 
it.  We’ll now examine some of the most common methods of localization of an 
interfering signal. 
B. LOCALIZATION 
1. Carrier/Noise (C/NO) Jammer Location Sensor 
This is a very basic method of estimating jammer location.  This approach takes 
the Carrier to Noise Ratio (C/No) data from the GPS receiver and logs it with respect to 
satellite signal strength and position and time data from the receiver.  One of the main 
benefits to this approach is that no additional special purpose GPS user equipment is 
needed since most GPS receivers already generate this information.  One of the major 
drawbacks to this method is that it depends on large variations of C/No ratios as a 
function of distance from jammer.  When low power jammers are used the C/No 
variation is not that large so this approach lacks the ability of identifying accurate jammer 
locations.  Figure 17 illustrates the simplicity of how a C/No Jammer Location Sensor 




























Figure 17.   C/No Sensor Architecture (After Brown, Reynolds, Roberts, & Serie)34 
                                                 
34 Brown and others, Jammer and Interference Location System - Design and Initial Test  
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This approach takes time-correlated data from numerous receivers and networks 
all of this information together and compiles it at a central station.  The central station 
then estimates jammer position based upon precisely known locations in the area and 
then compares this information to their reported locations.  Based on the C/No ratio an 
estimate is made as to the location of the jamming source. 
2. Angle of Arrival (AOA) Jammer Location Sensor 
This method of jammer location is accomplished with standard GPS user 
equipment that is integrated with a Controlled Radiation Pattern Antenna (CRPA) that is 
capable of detecting jammer signals.  The CRPA places a null in the antenna pattern in 
the direction of the jammer by using the detected AOA of the interfering signal.  A form 
of triangulation is used to determine jammer location by taking various readings of AOA 
as the equipment outfitted with GPS conducts its movements.  Although this type of 
information can be obtained from numerous GPS systems and then fed into a centralized 
processing system to estimate jammer location, the advantage of this approach is that it 
can be accomplished with only one system which is moving to triangulate in on the 
interfering signal.  Figure 18 depicts how an aircraft might use this type of system to 




Figure 18.   Aircraft using AOA and triangulation to locate jammer source (From Brown, 
Reynolds, Roberts, & Serie)35 
One disadvantage of this approach is that its accuracy is limited as a function of 
the pointing accuracy of the null it provides.  For a single receiver, the accuracy is also 
affected by the inertial heading accuracy of the equipment it is associated with.   
3. Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) Jammer Location Sensor  
This method of locating GPS jammers is more accurate than the two previously 
mentioned approaches.  The TDOA approach first involves the separating out of the 
jammer signal from the actual GPS signal.  The jammer signal is then measured in a 
synchronized manner using the GPS signal to get highly accurate timing information 
from two or more receivers simultaneously while the GPS receivers are moving.  The 
analysis of the amount of time it takes for the jammer signal to reach the receiver can 
then be used to find the distance from the jammer to the receiver.  Using this information 
for several different locations of at least three (ideally four) receivers yields a highly 
accurate triangulation picture which accurately estimates where the jamming source is 
emanating from in three dimensions. 
                                                 
35 Brown and others, Jammer and Interference Location System - Design and Initial Test  
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Wikipedia, although not necessarily always highly regarded in the academic and 
research circles, does provide a succinct and useful version of how multilateration in 
conjunction with TDOA measurements yields highly accurate locations of emitters.  Here 
is a portion of that presentation: 
Consider an emitter at unknown location (x,y,z) that we wish to locate. Consider 
also a multilateration system comprising four receiver sites at known locations: a central 
site, C, a left site, L, a right site, R and a fourth site, Q.  The travel time (T) of pulses 
from the emitter at (x,y,z) to each of the receiver locations is simply the distance divided 





If the site C is taken to be at the coordinate system origin, 
 
Then the time difference of arrival between pulses arriving directly at the central 





where is the location of the left receiver site, etc, and is the speed of 
propagation of the pulse, often the speed of light. Each equation defines a separate 
hyperboloid.  The multilateration system must then solve for the unknown target location 
(x,y,z) in real time. All the other symbols are known.36 
Another point to be made here is that multilateration is generally much more 
accurate than triangulation due to the fact that it is much easier to measure time 
accurately than it is to form the narrow beams necessary for triangulation.  Appendix B 
provides a much more thorough and developed derivation of position determination using 
TDOA of GPS satellite signals.  The derivation in Appendix B chooses to use four 
equations and four unknowns, partially because there are guaranteed to be four satellites 
in view of the horizon for any point on the earth, and mostly because adding a fourth 
equation allows for the ability to reach simple and satisfactory solutions due to the 
elimination of the square root terms which the inclusion of the fourth equation provides. 
 
                                                 
36 Wikipedia contributors, "Multilateration," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/multilateration?oldid=228786716 (accessed 8 June 2008).  
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IV. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONDUCTING GPS 
JAMMING 
The fact of land-based jamming being impeded by terrain and other obstacles are 
very relevant and useful pieces of information when it comes to the task of actually 
testing a GPS jammer within the continental United States.  Figure 19 illustrates the 
magnitude of impact that even a 0.5-watt GPS Jammer could have on a metropolitan area.   
 
 
Figure 19.   Unintended GPS Interference in a metropolitan area (From JNWC-Navwar-
Threat Overview Brief)37  
 
                                                 
37 Haseloff, JNWC-Navwar-Threat Overview Brief (Unclassified Portion) 
United States Army FA-40 Symposium, 1-2-30  
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Contrary to wishful thinking, one is not allowed to just haphazardly go about 
“testing” their GPS jammer wherever and whenever they want.  As a matter of fact, the 
requirements and approval process to conduct this type of testing can be extremely 
detailed and require an enormous amount of lead-time in order to legally conduct the 
tests. 
GPS is used extensively by the civilian community in commerce and 
science. Some examples of civilian GPS applications include use as a 
timing source for utilities and science, tracking devices for the 
transportation industry, quality assurance tools for agriculture, and 
navigation systems for civil aviation. Additionally, GPS is used for its 
original, intended application — military systems. In each of these uses, 
one commonality exits: the requirement for noninterference of the user 
community due to DoD testing.38 
Figure 20 gives a very general frequency clearance process for conducting GPS 
jamming within the continental United States.  Frequency clearance is essential when one 
considers that this type of jamming is actually affecting the signal from the GPS satellite 
and therefore would affect numerous military and civilian activities if not properly 
managed beforehand.  Looking at the routing in Figure 20 one can quickly surmise that it 
would require copious amounts of time to work the GPS jamming request through all of 
the necessary approval authorities.  If this were the only way that GPS jamming could be 
conducted then at least there would be a consistent approach to attacking this 
requirement.   
Unfortunately, specific processes for obtaining GPS jamming clearances 
vary extensively from base-to-base, and even within bases. The process of 
obtaining a frequency clearance at some facilities is no different than if 
one wished to install a two-way radio in a truck. Other ranges require 
extensive analysis (such as jamming footprint studies) and 
documentation.39 
 
                                                 
38 Matt Boggs and Kenea C. Maraffio, Mitigation Paths for Free-Space Jamming (China Lake, 
California: GPS/INS Systems Section, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCWPNS), 




Figure 20.   Generic GPSJ [GPS Jamming] Approval Process (From Boggs and 
Maraffio)40 
For our purposes here in Monterey, California one of the closest and most logical 
choices where one might even consider conducting GPS Jamming out in the open would 
be at Fort Hunter Liggett which is about an hour and a half away by car.  Appendix A 
provides a copy of their Training Support Request (TSR) form which illustrates the first 
two stages of Figure 20, which are coming up with a testing plan and then submitting that 
plan for approval through the local frequency manager.  
In order to come up with a valid testing plan for GPS Jamming one of the 
necessary prerequisites is to understand not only the power output of GPS Jammers but 
also the proper method with which to employ them to cause minimal impact upon other 
GPS users.  One of the ways to do this with GPS Jamming signals is to use jammers with 
directional antennas instead of omni-directional jammers.  Directional antennas afford the 
opportunity to continue with meaningful and realistic jamming scenarios while 
minimizing the likelihood that GPS users external to the testing will be affected.  
Directional antennas/emitters, as the name implies, allow the user to direct the signal in 
                                                 
40 Matt Boggs and Kenea C. Maraffio, Mitigation Paths for Free-Space Jamming (China Lake, 
California: GPS/INS Systems Section, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCWPNS), 
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/nav/gpsjam.pdf, (accessed 17 July 2008).  
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the direction that they would like.  Figure 21 shows the horizontal radiation pattern for a 
typical Directional Jammer.  In this Figure the primary lobe, the one with the greatest 
propagation, is directed due North with a 20º horizontal beamwidth (10º to either side of 
0º).  The secondary lobes on either side of the primary lobe have much less propagation 
range than the primary but can still be oriented as needed. 
 
Figure 21.   Horizontal Radiation Pattern for Directional Jammer (From Boggs and 
Maraffio)41   
Directional Jammers when coupled with proper terrain selection can provide 
significant mitigation capabilities when it comes to containing GPS Jamming signals.  
Knowing that you have a Directional Jammer you must also perform a reconnaissance of 
prospective jammer testing areas to ensure that adequate terrain, buildings, etcetera are 
available to act as a shield against the jamming signal.  This approach was taken for the 
planned jammer testing at Fort Hunter Liggett.  A standard 1:50,000 terrain map of Fort 
Hunter Liggett was initially used in concert with the locations of available Training Areas 
provided by Range Control, to get a sense of potential GPS Jammer testing sites.  Once 
                                                 
41 Matt Boggs and Kenea C. Maraffio, Mitigation Paths for Free-Space Jamming (China Lake, 
California: GPS/INS Systems Section, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCWPNS), 
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/nav/gpsjam.pdf, (accessed 17 July 2008).  
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several Training Areas were selected the reconnaissance then turned to the very useful 
and relatively new reconnaissance tool known as Google® Earth.   Google® Earth was 
used to zoom in on actual satellite images of the training areas in order to develop a 
greater appreciation for the available terrain.  The program was used to identify possible 
terrain features, like mountains for example, which could be used as a backstop for any 
GPS jamming.  The mountain would be the direction that the Directional GPS Jammer 
would be pointed at.  If possible, the side lobes of the signal propagation would be 
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V. JAMMING DEVICE 
Effective testing and evaluation of a GPS interference detection system requires 
that it be subjected to a jamming signal, matching the GPS L1 signal in frequency and 
bandwidth.  To that end, this chapter is dedicated to the construction and testing of a 
portable low power GPS jamming device.  The jamming device design was originally 
published in “Phrack” online magazine, and the design has now proliferated around the 
World Wide Web.  Figure 22 illustrates the schematic diagram for the jamming device. 
 
Figure 22.   Original Jamming Device Schematic42 
                                                 
42 Green Bay Professional Packet Radio, "Noise Jammer for the L1 GPS Frequency (1575.42 MHz)," 
http://www.qsl.net/n9zia/, (accessed 19 September 2008).  
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The circuit diagram was implemented using a professional schematic capture and 
layout software suite called PCB123©.  Using the PCB123© schematic program the 
components of the circuit were connected as illustrated in Figure 23.  
 
 
Figure 23.   Jamming Device Component Connections in PCB123© Schematic Program 
One of the difficulties encountered in using the PCB123© schematic program is 
that several of the components used in circuit were not available as standard library parts.  
Although the problem was eventually overcome by using the build part utility to create 
the required components, the process was extremely time intensive.  There were also 
multiple instances in which the program crashed and had to be reinstalled to recover the 
schematic file.  Once the schematic was complete, the resulting file was saved and 
converted into a netlist.  The netlist file maintains a list of all the components, their 
package types, as well as the interconnections between them. 
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Once completed, the schematic and its associated net list are exported to the 
PCB123© layout program.  Unfortunately, the exported components and the wires 
connecting them do not maintain the spatial integrity established in the schematic 
program.  A visual comparison of Figure 23 and Figure 24 below illustrates how the 
components look before and after the export. 
 
Figure 24.   Screenshot of Netlist Export to PCB Layout© 
After the export, the obligatory tasks are to rearrange the components in a logical 
manner and commence the wire routing process.  Generally, components are positioned 
to reflect the arrangement of the original schematic.  This is a common practice that 
facilitates troubleshooting and makes it easier follow signal paths through components.   
One of the critical tasks associated with building a layout for a circuit which 
operates at microwave frequencies is determining the dimensions of the microstrip lines.  
Microstrip lines are wire traces that propagate the RF signal from one component to 
another.  The dimensions of the microstrip lines in an RF design determine the desired 
characteristic impedance.  The specified characteristic impedance for the jamming device 
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is 50 ohms.  A simple formula for calculating the characteristic impedance of a microstrip 











In this equation, Zo is the characteristic impedance in ohms,ε  is dielectric 
constant, and w , t , and h are the width, thickness and height in millimeters of the copper 
trace above the ground plane, respectively.  Figure 25 shows a cross-sectional sketch of a 
microstrip line mounted on a printed circuit board. 
 
Figure 25.   Dimensions of PCB Mounted Microstrip Line44 
Microstrip transmission line is a kind of "high grade"printed circuit 
construction, consisting of a track of copper or other conductor on an 
insulating substrate. There is a "backplane" on the other side of the 
insulating substrate, formed from similar conductor.  Looked at end on, 
there is a "hot" conductor which is the track on the top, and a "return" 
conductor which is the backplane on the bottom. Microstrip is therefore a 
variant of 2-wire transmission line.  If one solves the electromagnetic 
equations to find the field distributions, one finds very nearly a completely 
TEM (transverse electromagnetic) pattern. This means that there are only 
a few regions in which there is a component of electric or magnetic field 
in the direction of wave propagation.  The quasi TEM pattern arises 
                                                 
43 Green Bay Professional Packet Radio, "Microstripline Analysis & Design Results," 
http://my.athenet.net/~multiplx/cgi-bin/strip.cgi, (accessed 19 September 2008).  
44 Ibid. 
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because of the interface between the dielectric substrate and the 
surrounding air. The electric field lines have a discontinuity in direction at 
the interface. The boundary conditions for electric field are that the normal 
component (i.e. the component at right angles to the surface) of the 
electric field times the dielectric constant is continuous across the 
boundary; thus in the dielectric which may have dielectric constant 10, the 
electric field suddenly drops to 1/10 of its value in air.45 
The actual dimensions for the jamming device’s microstrips were determined with 
an online calculator.  This web-based application requires only that one specify the 
dielectric constant and the characteristic impedance.  The remaining parameters for the 
microstrips are autonomously calculated for the user.  Figure 26 below displays the 
results for the jamming device’s microstrips.  The values specified for the dielectric 
constant and characteristic impedance are 4.8 and 50 ohms. 
Operating frequency : 2450.000 MHz 
Dielectric constant : 4.800 
Effective dielectric constant : 3.595 
Substrate thickness : 1.500 mm (0.059 inches / 59.055 mils) 
 
 
Microstripline impedance : 50.000 ohms 
Microstripline physical width : 2.777 mm (0.109 inches / 109.349 mils) 
Velocity factor : 0.523 
Velocity of propagation : 0.456 
One wavelength (360°) : 64.041 mm (2.521 inches / 2521.306 mils) 
Quarter wavelength (90°) : 16.010 mm (0.630 inches / 630.327 mils) 
Figure 26.   Results of Online Microstrip Calculator46 
The final layout for the printed circuit board was completed with microstrip 
specifications annotated in Figure 26.  Figures 27 and Figure 28 show the final layout and 
the actual printed circuit board produced. 
                                                 
45 David Jeffries, "What is Microstrip Transmission Line?" 
http://personal.ee.surrey.ac.uk/Personal/D.Jefferies/mstrip.html, (accessed 19 September 2008).  
46 Green Bay Professional Packet Radio, Microstripline Analysis & Design Results . 
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Figure 27.   Screenshot of Final PCB Layout© 
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Figure 28.   Printed Circuit Board Produced Using PCB Layout© 
The jamming device is comprised of three major sections.  First is the power 
section, which provides the interface for the 12-volt battery that runs the system.  Next is 
the noise generator.  This section provides the “static” which interferes with the pseudo-
random noise (PRN) codes transmitted by the orbiting GPS satellites.  Finally, the radio 
frequency (RF) section uses frequency modulation to mix the noise signal with the 
1575.42 MHz L1 carrier frequency, and then subsequently radiates the modulated carrier 
through an antenna.   
A. THE POWER SECTION 
As mentioned previously, the power section contains a 12-volt rechargeable 
battery, which provides a steady flow of energy to the jamming device.  However, like 
many unregulated portable power supply devices, the Powerflex© model 8SPA measures 
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slightly higher than its advertised 12 volts when fully charged.  Figure 29 shows the 
measured terminal voltage supplied by the battery.   
 
Figure 29.   Battery’s Measured Terminal Voltage 
The 13.6 volts supplied by the battery exceeds the supply voltages required by the 
integrated circuit components in the noise generator and RF sections.  The noise 
generator section has a single integrated circuit that requires nine volts for proper 
operation.  However, the RF section contains three integrated circuits, two of which 
require only five volts.  The third integrated circuit component in the RF section, the 
voltage controlled oscillator (VCO), is the only component in the jamming device which 
requires 12 volts.   
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The various voltage levels demands for the RF and noise generator sections is 
achieved with the use of three-terminal voltage regulators.  Each voltage regulator has an 
input, output, and ground terminal.  The task of a voltage regulator is to take a higher 
voltage that is applied to its input terminal and produce the desired regulated voltage at 
the output terminal.  The regulated output terminal voltage is fixed at the value specified 
by the manufacturer for the particular model in use.  For our jamming device, the 
regulated output terminal voltages are 12, 9, and 5 volts respectively.  The battery along 
with the three voltage regulators is connected in a cascaded fashion as indicated in Figure 
30. 
 
Figure 30.   Major Components in Power Section 
In Figure 30, the battery’s 13.6-volt positive terminal is attached to the input of 
the 12-volt regulator.  The regulator’s 12-volt output becomes the input to the 9-volt 
regulator.  The final regulator receives the 9-volt input and produces the final 5-volt 
output to complete the voltage distribution network.   
B. THE NOISE GENERATOR SECTION 
The key components in this section are the LM386 audio amplifier, the 6.8-volt 
zener diode, and a 2N3904 bipolar junction transistor.  The operation of the noise 
generator begins by reverse biasing the zener diode.  The zener diode is designed to 
operate in this reverse bias region once the zener potential of 6.8 volts has been reached.  
The zener diode produces low amplitude noise signals up to 100 MHz.  The noise signal 
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is subjected to further processing via the LM386 audio amplifier.  The LM386 amplifies 
and filters the signal for subsequent injection into the RF section through a variable 
resistor and capacitor network.  The oscillator will use this noise signal to modulate the 
L1 carrier frequency.  Figure 31 shows a schematic representation of the components in 
the noise section. 
 
Figure 31.   Major Components in Noise Section 
C. THE RADIO FREQUENCY SECTION 
The final section of the jamming device is the radio frequency section.  The 
function of the RF section is to produce the L1 carrier frequency and modulate the carrier 
with the noise signal.  The significant components comprising this section are the voltage 
controlled oscillator, the phase lock loop (PLL), and the prescaler. 
The voltage controlled oscillator, phase lock loop, and prescaler form a closed 
loop system that synthesize the carrier frequency.  To begin the process, the phase lock 
loop’s oscillator input is driven with a 10 MHz reference frequency derived from a quartz 
crystal.  Inside the phase lock loop, the 10 MHz reference frequency is divided 512 times 
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by the chip’s internal counter circuitry.  This produces a new reference frequency of 
19531.25 Hz.  The new reference frequency will be used for comparison to the frequency 
output of the prescaler.   
Initially, the voltage controlled oscillator produces an output frequency in 
response to a direct current voltage applied to its voltage tuning input.  A resistive 
network first attenuates the output signal’s voltage level.  Once the VCO’s output voltage 
is reduced by the attenuator network, a portion of the signal is fed into the prescaler, 
where its frequency is divided by 256 and passed to the phase lock loop.  At the PLL, the 
VCO signal’s frequency is divided by 315.  The resulting frequency quotient is then 
compared to the 19531.25 Hz reference frequency. 
During the comparison process, the phase lock loop attempts to validate that the 
two signals have the same frequency and phase.  If both signals match in frequency and 
phase, the phase lock loop applies a direct current voltage to the VCO’s tuning input.  
The direct current voltage at the tuning input again drives the VCO’s output frequency 
where the process begins anew and continues indefinitely. 
In the event that the reference frequency and the VCO’s output frequency do not 
match, the phase lock loop will attempt to compensate for the difference.  If the VCO’s 
frequency is higher than 19531.25 Hz reference, the phase lock loop will make every 
effort to lower the VCO’s  frequency to 19531.25 Hz and achieve phase lock.  The phase 
lock loop will attempt to raise the VCO’s frequency if it is below the 19531.25 Hz 
reference.   
The phase lock condition can be verified through one of several outputs on the 
PLL. The most readily available method is to observe the status of the phase detector 
output pin using an oscilloscope.  When the reference frequency and VCO input 
frequency are matched, phase lock is achieved, and the phase detector output pin will 
display a steady direct current voltage on the oscilloscope.  However, if the VCO 
frequency is higher, an oscilloscope will display a series of negative pulses, and a series 
of positive pulses if it is lower.  Figure 32 illustrates the positive pulses detected at the 
phase detector output indicating lack of phase lock. 
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Figure 32.   Positive pulses at phase detector output indicating lack of phase lock 
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VI. DETECTOR AND LOCATION SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
In order to contend with the threat posed by portable GPS jamming devices, an 
architecture must be established to facilitate the detection and location of electromagnetic 
interference.  Collectively, the components of the architecture should allow for one or 
more of the localization techniques described in the previous chapter to be implemented.  
The specific functions inclusive to the architecture must encompass: 
• RF sensing 
• Data logging 
• Terrain mapping  
• GPS signal-to-noise monitoring 
These functions outlined above can be implemented with combinations of 
commercially available hardware and software.  The use of commercial products is more 
practical than a bottom up approach to designing the necessary hardware and software 
components. The task that lies ahead for the remainder of this chapter is identifying 
commercial products that will allow the architecture to be realized.    
A. RF SENSING 
The RF sensor is the most critical component in the architecture.  The sensor 
component will be the “eyes and ears” of the system and will provide the capability to 
detect electromagnetic interference within the bandwidth of interest.  Specifically, the 
sensing requirement calls for a component that can detect 1575.42 MHz RF carriers as 
well as any accompanying modulating signal.   
The Digital Scout© is a commercially available frequency counter capable of 
detecting RF signals from 10 – 2600 MHz.  The unit can internally store up to 1000 
detected frequencies or alternatively, log the captured frequencies to an external device 
via serial bus interface.  In addition, it also logs data on the relative signal strength of 
detected signals.  The Digital Scout’s© resolution bandwidth ratings are 100 Hz and 
1kHz.  The resolution bandwidth specification is important since detection of interference 
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signals requires that an RF sensor have resolution bandwidth down to 1 kHz or less at 
either the L1 frequency or at the intermediate frequency.  Figure 33 illustrates the Digital 
Scout® frequency counter. 
 
Figure 33.   The Digital Scout® handheld frequency counter (From Optoelectronics®) 
The Digital Scout® also comes with accompanying software to facilitate external 
data logging.  However, as an alternative, Classic Business Technologies® offers a 
software suite designed to work with Optoelectronics® products.  The Classic Business 
Technologies® suite offers more data logging features than the standard package included 
with the Digital Scout®.  Figure 34 shows an example of data that can be logged by the 
OptoSuite Pro® software. 
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Figure 34.   Screenshot showing some data logging features available in Classic Business 
Technologies OptoSuite Pro® software 
B. DATA LOGGING 
The data logging component of the architecture is fairly simple.  This component 
can be implemented with either a portable laptop computer, or a Personal Digital 
Assistant (PDA) type device.  The primary requirement for data logger is that is must 
possess sufficient memory, and be accommodate the software demands for the 
architecture. 
C. TERRAIN MAPPING 
This feature of the architecture will co-exist with the data logger as a software 
package.  The purpose of terrain mapping software is to provide an interactive digital 




should allow the user to plot coordinates as well as determine range and bearing between 
coordinates.  Google® Earth is well renowned software package that possesses these 
features. 
D. GPS SIGNAL-TO-NOISE MONITORING 
The GPS signal-to-noise ratio (S/N) monitoring feature is a critical component of 
the architecture.  The ability to monitor and assess changes in the GPS S/N will provide a 
means of correlating significant drops in S/N with incidences of L1 carrier frequency 
detections picked up by the RF sensor.  Many commercial GPS receivers support this 
capability through the National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA) 
communications protocol.  Using the NMEA protocol and serial interface cable, an 
NMEA enabled GPS receiver can be connected to the data logger.  The data logger can 
be used to interrogate the GPS receiver with NMEA sentences to extract its internally 





Figure 35.   Using a NMEA sentence to extract S/N information from a GPS receiver47 
 
                                                 
47 Dale DePriest, "NMEA Data," http://www.gpsinformation.org/dale/nmea.htm (accessed 22 




      GSV          Satellites in view 
      2            Number of sentences for full data 
      1            sentence 1 of 2 
      08           Number of satellites in view 
 
      01           Satellite PRN number 
      40           Elevation, degrees 
      083          Azimuth, degrees 
      46           SNR - higher is better 
           for up to 4 satellites per sentence 
      *75          the checksum data, always begins with * 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although this thesis was not able to fully meet the initial lofty goals of Designing, 
Building, and Testing a Handheld GPS Interference Detector, much progress in the 
groundwork towards that endeavor has been achieved.  In hindsight, trying to accomplish 
this much technical sophistication by two Space System Operators in a very short 
timeframe while simultaneously taking courses, was definitely a bridge too far.  But, 
having said that, much research and design has been accomplished which can be used to 
drive this goal further down the road to fruition. 
The disadvantaged tactical warfighter who is forward deployed requires the 
capability to gain actionable intelligence when his GPS environment encounters a 
jamming situation.  The warfighter needs to be to quickly ascertain the difference 
between when he is indeed being jammed and when it is nothing more than his GPS 
enabled equipment or munitions that have malfunctioned.  He also needs the ability to 
learn exactly where that interference is coming from so that he can determine if it is 
malicious or not and then take the appropriate action to terminate the interference.  These 
forward deployed warfighters at the tip of spear in harms way often do not have the time 
to wait for the large, detailed analysis conducted by organizations far from them both 
physically and mentally.  There are several AF TENCAP programs currently on-going 
now that still do not provide the capability to provide this type of information 
immediately and autonomously to the disadvantaged warfighter on the front line.  These 
warfighters do not have the ability to pack a computer with SIPRNET capability to access 
certain sites to try to determine what has happened to their GPS signal and even if they 
did this is not something which they should have to search for.  The bottom-line is that 
this is the type of information that must be pushed forward to individuals depending on 
the accuracy of GPS instead of being pulled after a problem has been encountered and 
solutions are being sought after. 
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The fact still remains that currently in the war zones and for the foreseeable future 
there will continue to be sources of interference which impede or totally degrade GPS 
signals to the point which renders GPS munitions and equipment inoperable.  According 
to the vast majority of recent reports coming from the war zone, the current sources of 
GPS interference are for the most part self-inflicted interference by friendly forces. This 
interference appears to be mostly due to errant communication devices transmitting at 
incorrect frequencies or the harmonics of certain transmissions frequencies which 
coincide with the L-band frequencies of GPS. 
This thesis has provided an overview of six of some of the most recent and 
common approaches to detecting GPS jamming whether that jamming is pulsed or CW: 
Correlator Output Power, Variance of Correlator Output Power, Carrier Phase 
Vacillation, Active Gain Control (AGC) Control Loop Gain, Multiple-Model Adaptive 
Estimation (MMAE), and Receiver Estimation of C/No.  Several of these approaches are 
facets of other approaches and when used in conjunction with other methods provide a 
more accurate characterization of the interference. 
The issue of localization of the jammer location has also been addressed through 
the three approaches of: Carrier/Noise (C/No) Jammer Location Sensor, Angle of Arrival 
(AOA) Jammer Location Sensor, and Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) Jammer 
Location Sensor.  The most accurate of these is the TDOA method because it relies on 
the highly reliable nanosecond timing of the cesium clocks on-board GPS satellites.  This 
approach based on highly accurate timing is markedly more accurate than the 
triangulation approach which requires extremely narrow beamwidths to be pointed over 
vast distances between the satellites in MEO and the receivers on the ground. 
The Decision was made to design, build, and test a low-powered GPS Jammer 
from a design easily obtained off of the Internet.  This approach was chosen because it 
was deemed to be a realistic choice considering that a common threat of the United States 
for the foreseeable future appears to be terrorist elements.  It was thought that they would 
be much more likely to try to gain an asymmetric advantage by using open source GPS 
Jammer designs rather than invest the time, money, and infrastructure required to develop 
the larger and more powerful GPS Jammers.  Also, by building their own jammers they 
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would be able to rid themselves of the necessity to purchase GPS jammers which might 
make their possible intentions able to be more easily tracked and denied.  This approach 
was also chosen because we too could not just go out and purchase a GPS Jammer off of 
the street and even if we could the cost of even small jammers would be prohibitive for 
the available money that we would have at our disposal. 
Unfortunately, even after numerous attempts and trouble shooting over a 
considerable timeframe, we were unable to get our GPS Jammer to produce the desired 
frequency to jam the GPS L1 Frequency (1575.42 MHz).  Achieving this fundamental 
benchmark was crucial to the follow-on work of testing the jammer effective ranges.  It 
was also critical for the intended analysis of the jamming on the GPS signal for the 
civilian Garmin GPS receiver and the military’s Precision Lightweight Ground Receiver 
(PLGR).  All coordination had been made for training areas and obtaining PLGRs for 
testing.  Without an operable jammer we were unable to conduct the field tests of 
detecting and locating the jamming source.   
We recommend that any future work towards this endeavor pick-up where we left 
off.  A lot of time and effort was put into learning how to use the PCB software which 
allowed us to design the PCB boards and have them professionally manufactured.  This 
measure was taken to minimize the probability that something might be poorly 
constructed by two novice electronic technicians.  In the process of meticulously 
soldering all of the surface-mounted extremely tiny capacitors, resistors, conductors, 
etcetera, we have graduated from novice solderers to journeyman solderers.  Recommend 
that any future work begin with continued testing of the GPS Jammer boards to ascertain 
why the correct frequency is not being generated.  Once this gets accomplished then the 
testing of the jammers effective ranges and the identification and localization of the 
jamming can be examined using some of the methods described in this thesis.  
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APPENDIX A 
This appendix provides an example of a blank Training Support Request (TSR) to 
conduct any type of training on Fort Hunter Liggett, California.  The purpose of 
providing this form here is to illustrate and corroborate some of the initial requirements 
for conducting GPS Jamming.  Although this form is not specifically for GPS Jamming, 
it does capture the requirement to provide a detailed test plan (Concept of Operations) 
and to request the clearance of any frequencies that will be used, i.e., 1575.42 MHz for 
L1 GPS jamming. 
FORT HUNTER LIGGETT TRAINING SUPPORT REQUEST (TSR) FORM 
 
NOTE: Units must complete the TSR. Incomplete TSR’s will result in a delay of scheduling. Previous 
TSR editions are obsolete. Only personnel listed below are authorized to make changes.  
 
Due to current construction projects, areas requested are subject to change. 
 
Submit TSR and supporting documents via email to the Training Division: RangeOps2@liggett-
emh1.army.mil Commercial phone numbers are: (831) 386-2510/2310/3145. DSN: 686-2510/2310/3145. If 
unable to email, please fax to (831) 386-2766 or mail to: Commander, CSTC, Ft Hunter Liggett, ATTN: 
AFRC-FMH-DTS, Jolon, CA 93978-7111. Email is the preferred method of submission. Please call to 
confirm receipt of TSR and any documents that are sent. 
 
1. General Unit Information 
A. Unit: Date TSR Submitted: 
B. Unit Higher Headquarters: Component: USAR, ARNG, USN, USNR, USMC, 
Other (specify) 
C. Unit Identification Code (UIC): DoD Activity Address Code (DODAAC): 









F. Type of Training: Annual Training, MUTA 4, MUTA 5, Other (explain) 
G. Personnel/Vehicle/Aircraft Strength: 
 DATE / TIME Officers M/F Enlisted M/F 
Arrival Advance Party    
Arrival Main Body    
Departure Main Body    
Departure Rear 
Detachment 
   
Types of Vehicles Vehicle Quantity Types of Aircraft Aircraft Quantity 
 64
    
    
    
    
H. Unit Training/Operations Objectives: (Individual MOS Training, Weapons Qualification, FTX, LFX, 
CLFX, FCX, CPX, TEWT, etc.)  
NOTE Unit must provide:  
(1) Concept of operations and training objectives.  
(2) Overlays (convoy routes, foot marches, dig plans, obstacle plans, smoke/obscurant operations, surface 
danger zone diagrams, etc.) that support the training or live-fire exercise. These documents must be 
received before you will be allowed to sign for any training site or facility.  
(3) Appointment Orders for OIC’s and RSO’s. Land Usage Briefings are given on Fridays at 1400 Hours at 












2. Scheduling of Facilities. All facilities and support will be requested and scheduled by the Training Division. 
 
A. Training Area and Facility Requests. All training area and range requests are controlled by the Training Division 
(Bldg S-320 Range Control). Check each Training Area or Facility required and provide the training dates and times 
for the occupation of those areas. Only request areas that will be used. Requesting a facility does not give you the 
TA unless so requested. Provide Actual Training or Firing Dates and Times for each area being requested. 
 
  Arrival Date / Time Departure Date / Time 
 TA 1   
 TA 2   
 North Land Nav Course   
 NBC Chamber   
 TA 3   
 TA 4   
 TA 5   
 TA 6   
 Crocker Range   
 TA 6B   
 TA 7   
 TA 8   
 TA 9   
 TA 10   
 TA 11   
 TA 12A   
 Horton DZ   
 TA 12B   
 TA 12C   
 TA 13E   
 East Land Nav Beginner   
 East Land Nav Intermediate   
 TA 13W   
 25 Meter Zero Range   
 KD Automated Record Fire Range   
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 Combat Pistol Qualification Range   
 Confidence Obstacle Course   
 Conditioning Obstacle Course   
 Rappel Tower   
 TA 14   
 TA 15   
 EPW Training Site   
 Convoy Live Fire Range  
(SDZ affects TAs 15,16,19,20,21,24) 
  
 Convoy Blank Fire Course  
(TAs 15, 20, 24) 
  
 Patricia Drop Zone   
 TA 16   
 TTB 8J   
 Area 8J Buildings   
 TA 16B   
 Pugil Pit   
 Bayonet Assault Course   
 Hand Grenade Inert Assault Course   
 Rope Bridge Site   
 Schoonover Tactical Assault Airstrip   
 TTB Schoonover   
 Miller Shower Point   
 Lower Blackjack (Area around shower)   
 TA 17   
 TA 18   
 TA 19   
 TA 20   
 Demolition Site / Engineer Construction   
  Arrival Date / Time Departure Date / Time 
 TA 21   
 TA 22   
 MPRC Ammo Holding Area   
 Machine Gun Range, MPRC   
 Main Tank Tower, MPRC   
 M203 Range, MPRC   
 B9 Range, MPRC  
(Firing points set-up for 25 meter Zero) 
  
 Hand Grenade HE Range, MPRC   
 TA 23   
 TA 24   
 TA 25*   
 TA 26   
 Palisades Rappel Site   
 TA 27   
 MOUT Site   
 South Land Nav Course   
 TTB Ward   
 TA 28   
 TA 29   
    
 88M Test Course (Main Gate Area)   
 Drown Proofing Facility  
(Post Fitness Center Pool) 
  
 TUSI Heliport   
 Drop Zone/Landing Zone   
 Post Theater (350 Pax)   
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* Environmental restrictions apply to TA 25. Environmental Review required for any activity. 
 
 
B. Billeting Request: Include the Quantity by Male and Female Bays or Rooms, Arrival and Departure dates and 
times. 
 
FACILITY Quantity of Male/Female Arrival Date/Time Departure Date/Time 
40-Person Open Bay    
2-Person Rooms    
Admin Office Areas    
 
 
3. Specialized Support Requests. All specialized requests must be coordinated with the Training Division. Provide a 
Memorandum to the Training Division requesting the support needed. All requests must be submitted by Training 
Division unless otherwise noted.  
 
Email: RangeOps2@liggett-emh1.army.mil  Commercial phone numbers are: (831) 386-2510/2310/3145. DSN: 686-
2510/2310/3145. If unable to email, please fax to (831) 386-2766 or mail to: Commander, CSTC, Ft Hunter Liggett, 
ATTN: AFRC-FMH-DTS, Jolon, CA 93978-7111. Email is the preferred method of submission. Please call to confirm 
receipt of any documents that are sent. The Training Division will task the Ft Hunter Liggett Directorates to provide the 
support requested. Indicate support requests needed by checking the appropriate box and providing additional 
memorandums for each required service. Failure to do so will result in a delay of coordinated support. 
 
Chemical Latrines: USAR units must provide a Latrine Request if needed. All other entities must contract a 
latrine provider directly and arrange for delivery and payment. A list of providers will be provided if requested. 
 
           Ice request: Provide a memo with quantity and type requested, date and time for pick-up. 
 
 
POL Support: FHL offers retail and bulk fuel capacities of JP-8, MOGAS and other POL products. Memos 
must include DODAAC, fuel type, estimated quantity and number of fuel keys. 
 
DOL Vehicle Support: DOL has a limited number of administrative vehicles which are issued on a 
reimbursable basis. Provide a memo for request and method of payment Amount of reimbursable will be 
dependent upon request. 
 
Telecommunications Support: FHL controls computer interface, field phone hook-ups (MAGDROPS), 
frequency usage and other communications services. Provide a memo with specific support requirements. 
 




Radio Support: Units must provide their own FM radio support. A limited number of hand-held radios are 
available. Provide a memo for type of radio support requested, along with quantity requested. 
 
Integrated Training Area Management (ITAM): Soldier Field Cards, environmental awareness briefings, 
pre-exercise planning (avoiding sensitive cultural & natural resources), GPS/GIS. Located in Bldg 331, phone 
x-2305, Email: Art.Hazebrook@liggett-emh1.army.mil 
 
Environmental Support: Activities described in FHL 350-2 require environmental clearance or for hazardous 
waste. Submit Environmental Reviews to the Training Division Not Later Than 45 days prior to training.  
 
Dining Facility Support: FHL Dining Facility can feed up to 960 people per meal. Mermites and UGR’s are 
also available (Chow, Box lunch, Beverages, Mermites, MRE’s, Organizational meals). Memos must be 




Billeting: Provide a current DA 1687 for individuals to draw billets. If linen is requested, provide a memo for 
quantity. Phone: (831) 386-2644/2075. Email: FHLBilletRequest@liggett-emh1.army.mil 
 
Arms Room: Units must provide the Access Roster a minimum of 14 days prior to the codes being issued. 
Roster will contain at least 2, but not more than 6 names, time period needed and the Commander’s signature. 
Access codes will be picked up at LEA upon arrival. Email requested to FHLBilletRequest@liggett-
emh1.army.mil 
 
MWR Support: For the Post Pool, Gym, Picnic grounds, etc, provide memo with the dates and supported 
requested. Contact the MWR manager Mr Tertulien at (831) 386-2910. Email: Charlemagne.Tertulien@liggett-
emh1.army.mil 
  
Religious Support: If support is requested, contact the Chapel in Bldg 190, (831) 386-2808/2465. Fax: x-3102. 
 
 
Ammunition Supply Point (ASP): FHL contains a fully functional ASP for issue and turn-in. Hours of 
operation are 0730-1630 Hours, Monday thru Friday. All ammunition must be coordinated with FHL ASP. 
Submit DA 581 to the ASP in Bldg S-723, phone (831) 386-2614, Email: quasas@liggett-emh1.army.mil 
Note: To draw ammunition, all units must bring their DA 581 to be signed and approved by the Training Division prior 
to drawing. 
 
Equipment Concentration Site (ECS-170): The DCSLOG, 63rd RSC, USARC manages and controls the 
equipment from ECS. Units must first contact the ECS Site Manager and determine the availability of 
equipment (vehicles, radios, etc) and make initial coordination. Phone (831) 386-2213/3598/2801/2770. Email: 
ECS170@us.army.mil 
 
AAFES/Commissary: If AAFES support is requested, call (831) 385-4585, Bldg 80. If Commissary support is 
requested, call 386-2190, Bldg 83. 
 
Transient Lodging Requirements: Available for TDY and temporary stays. For reservations, contact the 
Lodging Office in Bldg 196. Phone (831) 386-2511/2108 
 
FAD and MIPR Requirements: Mailing address for all Finance Authorization Documents (FAD) (USAC units) or 
Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests (MIPR):  
 
US Army Combat Support Training Center 
Attn: Resource Management Office 
Bldg 312, 9th Street 
Dublin, CA 94568 
 
POC: Ms Laura Orozco 
Commercial Phone: (925) 875-4423 
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APPENDIX B 
This appendix expounds upon, in much greater detail, the actual mathematical 
calculations necessary to locate a signal using Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA).  The 
algorithm is developed for simultaneously solving four equations and four unknowns 
which represent the distances to/from any four satellites that are guaranteed to be in the 
horizon of any location on earth.48  In their article, “A synthesizable VHDL Model of the 
Exact Solution for Three-Dimensional Hyperbolic Positioning System,” Ralph Bucher 
and D. Misra methodically derive and develop the necessary equations for determining 
positions of mobile elements on the earth by using the TDOA information of the satellite 
signals. 
                                                 
48 Ralph Bucher and D. Misra, "A Synthesizable VHDL Model of the Exact Solution for Three-
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